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Abstract—This paper studies the physical layer security in
a multiple-input-multiple-output (MIMO) dual-functional radar-
communication (DFRC) system, which communicates with down-
link cellular users and tracks radar targets simultaneously. Here,
the radar targets are considered as potential eavesdroppers
which might eavesdrop the information from the communication
transmitter to legitimate users. To ensure the transmission
secrecy, we employ artificial noise (AN) at the transmitter and
formulate optimization problems by minimizing the signal-to-
interference-plus-noise ratio (SINR) received at radar targets,
while guaranteeing the SINR requirement at legitimate users.
We first consider the ideal case where both the target angle and
the channel state information (CSI) are precisely known. The
scenario is further extended to more general cases with target
location uncertainty and CSI errors, where we propose robust op-
timization approaches to guarantee the worst-case performances.
Accordingly, the computational complexity is analyzed for each
proposed method. Our numerical results show the feasibility of
the algorithms with the existence of instantaneous and statistical
CSI error. In addition, the secrecy rate of secure DFRC system
grows with the increasing angular interval of location uncertainty.
Index Terms—Dual-functional radar-communication system,
secrecy rate, artificial noise, channel state information.
I. INTRODUCTION
THE increasing spectrum congestion has intensified theefforts in dynamic spectrum licensing and soon spectrum
is to be shared between radar and communication applications.
Govermental organizations such as the US Department of
Defence (DoD) have a documented requirement of releasing
865 MHz to support telemetry by the year of 2025, but
only 445 MHz is available at present [1]. As a result, the
operating frequency bands of communication and radar are
overlapped with each other [2], which leads to mutual in-
terference between two systems. Furthermore, both systems
have been recently given a common spectrum portion by the
Federal Communication Commission (FCC) [3]–[5]. To enable
the efficient usage of the spectrum, research efforts are well
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underway to address the issue of communication and radar
spectrum sharing (CRSS).
Aiming for realizing the spectral coexistence of individ-
ual radar and communication systems, several interference
mitigation techniques have been proposed in [6]–[11]. As
a step further, dual-functional radar-communication (DFRC)
system that is capable of realizing not only the spectral
coexistence, but also the shared use of the hardware platform,
has been regarded as a promising research direction [12]–[15].
It is noteworthy that the DFRC technique has already been
widely explored in numerous civilian and military applica-
tions, including 5G vehicular network [16], WiFi based indoor
positioning [17], low-probability-of-intercept (LPI) commu-
nication [18] as well as the advanced multi-function radio
frequency concept (AMRFC) [19].
In the DFRC system, radar and communication function-
alities are realized by a well-designed probing waveform
that carries communication signalling and data. Evidently,
this operation implicates security concerns, which are largely
overlooked in the relevant DFRC literature. It is known that
typical radar requires to focus the transmit power towards the
directions of interest to obtain a good estimation of the targets.
Nevertheless, in the case of DFRC transmission, critical infor-
mation embedded in the probing waveform could be leaked
to the radar targets, which might be potential eavesdroppers
at the adversary’s side. To this end, it is essential to take
information security into consideration for the DFRC design.
In the communication literature, physical layer security has
been widely investigated, where the eavesdroppers’ reception
can be crippled by exploiting transmit degrees of freedom
(DoFs) [20]. MIMO secrecy capacity problems were consid-
ered in [21]–[23]. Besides, another meaningful technique for
enabling physical layer secrecy was presented in [20], [24],
namely artificial noise (AN) aided transmission. Furthermore,
the AN generation algorithms studied in [25], [26] were with
the premise of publicly known channel state information (CSI)
in a fading environment. Moreover, some concurrent AN-
aided studies employed cooperative jammers to improve secure
communication [27], [28].
Given the dual-functional nature of the DFRC systems,
the secrecy issue can be addressed on the aspect of either
radar or communication. From the perspective of the radar
system, existing works focus on the radar privacy maintenance
[8], [29], [30]. A functional architecture was presented in [8]
for the control center aiming at coordinating the cooperation
between radar and communication while maintaining the pri-
2vacy of the radar system. In [29], obfuscation techniques have
been proposed to counter the inference attacks in the scenario
of spectrum sharing between military radars and commercial
communication systems. Besides, the work of [30] showed the
probability for an adversary to infer radar’s location by exploit-
ing the communication precoding matrices. On the other hand,
the works of [31], [32] have studied the secrecy problems from
the viewpoint of communications. In [31], the MIMO radar
transmits two different signals simultaneously, one of which is
embedded with desired information for the legitimate receiver,
the other one consists of false information to confuse the
eavesdroppers. Both of the signals are used to detect the tar-
get. Several optimization problems were presented, including
secrecy rate maximization, target return signal-to-interference-
plus-noise ratio (SINR) maximization and transmit power
minimization. Then, a unified joint system of passive radar
and communication systems was considered in [32], where the
communication receivers might be eavesdropped by the target
of passive radar. To guarantee the secrecy of legitimate user
in the communication system, the optimization problem was
designed to maximize the SINR at the passive radar receiver
(RR) while keeping the secrecy rate above a certain threshold.
While the aforementioned approaches are well-designed by
sophisticated techniques, the AN-aided physical layer security
remains to be explored for the DFRC systems under practical
constraints.
To the best of our knowledge, most of the present works
regarding secure transmission in DFRC system rely on the
assumption of precisely known channel state information (CSI)
at the transmitter. To address the beamforming design in a
general context, we take the imperfect CSI into account in our
work, which includes instantaneous and statistical CSI with
norm-bounded errors. Moreover, the well-known S-procedure
and Lagrange dual function have been adopted to reformulate
the optimization problem, which can be solved by Semidifinite
Relaxation (SDR) approach. In addition to the CSI issues, we
also explore the radar-specific target uncertainty, where we
employ a robust adaptation technique for target tracking.
Accordingly, in this paper, we propose several optimization
problems aiming at ensuring information transmission security
of the DFRC system. To be specific, we consider a MIMO
DFRC base station (BS) that is serving multiple legitimate
users while detecting targets. It should be noted that these
targets are assumed to be potential eavesdroppers. Moreover,
spatially focused AN is employed in our methods. Throughout
the paper, we aim to minimize the SINR at the target while
ensuring the SINR at each legitimate user. Within this scope,
we summarize our contributions as follows:
• We first consider the ideal scenario under the assumptions
of perfect CSI and known precise location of targets. The
beampattern is formed by approaching to a given bench-
mark radar beampattern. By doing so, the formulated
optimization problem can be firstly recast as Fractional
programming (FP) problem [33], and then solved by the
SDR.
• We investigate the problem under the practical condition
of target location uncertainty, where we formulate a
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Fig. 1. Dual-functional Radar-Communication system detecting target which
comprise a potential eavesdropper.
beampattern with a given angular interval that the targets
might fall into.
• We impose the imperfect communication CSI to the
optimization in addition to the above constraints, where
worst-case FP problems are formulated to minimize the
maximum SINR at the target with bounded CSI errors.
• We consider the statistical CSI, which is more practi-
cal due to significantly reduced feedback requirements
[34]. To tackle this scenario, we further formulate the
eavesdropper SINR minimization problem considering
the error bound of statistical CSI.
• We derive the computational complexity for each pro-
posed algorithm.
This paper is organized as follows. Section II gives the
system model. The optimization problems based on perfect
CSI are addressed in Section III and IV for precise location
and uncertain direction of targets, respectively. In Section
V and VI, more general context of imperfect CSI is con-
sidered, which addresses issues with imperfect CSI under
norm-bounded and statistical errors, respectively. Section VII
provides numerical results, and Section VIII concludes the
paper.
Notations: Unless otherwise specified, matrices are denoted
by bold uppercase letters (i.e., H), vectors are represented by
bold lowercase letters (i.e., x), and scalars are denoted by
normal font (i.e., α). Subscripts indicate the location of the
entry in the matrices or vectors (i.e., si,j and ln are the (i, j)-
th and the n-th element in S and l, respectively). tr (·) and
vec (·) denote the trace and the vectorization operations. (·)T ,
(·)H , (·)∗ and (·)† stand for transpose, Hermitian transpose,
complex conjugate and Moore-Penrose pseudo-inverse of the
matrices, respectively. diag (·) represents the vector formed
by the diagonal elements of the matrices and rank (·) is rank
operator. ‖·‖, ‖·‖∞ and ‖·‖F denote the l2 norm, l∞ and
the Frobenius norm respectively. E {·} denotes the statistical
expectation. [·] + denotes max {·, 0}.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
We consider a dual-functional MIMO DFRC system, which
consists of a DFRC base station, legitimate users and target
which is a potential eavesdropper, as shown in Fig. 1. The
3DFRC system is equipped with uniform linear array (ULA)
of N antennas, serving K single-antenna users, while detecting
a single point-like target. For convenience, the multi-antenna
transmitter, the legitimate users and the target will be referred
as Alice, Bobs and Eve respectively.
A. Signal Model
In the scenario shown in Fig. 1, the DFRC base station Alice
intends to send confidential information to single-antenna
legitimate users, i.e. Bobs, with the presence of the potential
eavesdropper, i.e. Eve. The received symbol vector at Bobs
can be modeled as
y = Hx+ z (1)
where H = [h1,h2, · · · ,hK ]T ∈ CK×N is the channel
matrix, x ∈ CN is the transmitted signal vector, z is the noise
vector, with z ∼ CN (0, σ2IN ).
Consider AN-aided transmit beamforming, the transmit vec-
tor x can be written as
x =Ws+ n (2)
where s ∈ CK is the desired symbol vector of Bobs, where
we assume E
[
ssH
]
= I, W = [w1,w2, · · · ,wK ] ∈ CN×K
is the beamforming matrix, n is an artificial noise vector
generated by Alice to avoid leaking information to Eves. It
is assumed that n ∼ CN (0,RN). Additionally, we assume
that the desired symbol vector s and the artificial noise vector
n are independent with each other.
According to [9], it is presumed that the above signal is
used for both radar and communication operations, where each
communication symbol is considered as a snapshot of a radar
pulse. Then, the covariance matrix of radar system can be
given as
RX = E
[
xxH
]
=
K∑
i=1
Wi +RN , (3)
whereWi , wiw
H
i . Then, the beampattern can be expressed
as
Pbp = a
H (θ)RXa (θ) , (4)
where θ is the angle of target, a (θ) =[
1 ej2pi∆ sin(θ) · · · ej2pi(N−1)∆ sin(θ)]T ∈ CN×1 denotes
the steering vector of the transmit antenna array, and ∆ is the
interval between adjacent antennas being normalized by the
wavelength.
B. Metrics
To evaluate the performance of the system, we define a
number of performance metrics in this subsection. Initially,
based on the aforementioned system model, the SINR of the
i-th user can be written as
SINRi =
E
[∣∣hTi wis∣∣2
]
∑K
k 6=i,k=1 E
[∣∣hTi wks∣∣2
]
+ E
[∣∣hTi n∣∣2
]
+ σ2
=
hTi Wih
∗
i∑K
k 6=i,k=1
(
hTi Wkh
∗
i
)
+
(
hTi RNh
∗
i
)
+ σ2
,
(5)
where ni is the AN of i-th user.
Equation (5) can be simplified
SINRi =
tr
(
h∗ih
T
i Wi
)
∑K
k 6=i,k=1 tr
(
h∗ih
T
i Wk
)
+ tr
(
h∗ih
T
i RN
)
+ σ2
.
(6)
The achievable transmission rate of legitimate users is given
as
RCi = log2 (1 + SINRi) . (7)
Likewise, based on the given signal model in (3) and (4),
SINR at Eve can be given as [35]
SINRE =
|α|2aH (θ)∑Ki=1Wia (θ)
|α|2aH (θ)RNa (θ) + σ2
, (8)
where α represents the propagation loss in radar system. The
achievable transmission rate of Eve can be expressed as
RE = log2 (1 + SINRE) . (9)
Additionally, the transmit power is expressed as
Pt = tr(RX). (10)
Given the achievable transmission rates of Bobs and Eve, the
achievable secrecy rate of the system is defined as [36]
SR = min
i
1
2
[RCi −RE ]+. (11)
III. MINIMIZING SINR OF EVE WITH PREMISE OF
PERFECT CSI AND TARGET DIRECTION
In this section, we aim to enhance the secrecy rate by
minimizing the SINR of Eve and setting a lower threshold
of SINR for the legitimate users, i.e. Bobs. The optimization
problem is based on the assumption that the channel informa-
tion from Alice to Bobs in the communication system is known
perfectly. Meanwhile, the precise direction of the detected
target is known to the transmitter. We shall relax the above
assumptions in the following sections.
A. Problem Formulation
Let us firstly consider the SINRE minimization problem,
which should guarantee: a) individual SINR requirement at
each legitimate user, b) transmit power budget and c) a desired
radar spatial beampattern. Note that an ideal radar beampattern
should be obtained before designing the beamforming and ar-
tificial noise, which can be generated by solving the following
constrained least-squares (LS) problem [9], [37] as an example
min
η,Rd
M∑
m=1
∣∣ηPd (θm)− aH (θm)Rda (θm)∣∣2
s.t. tr (Rd) = P0,
Rd  0,Rd = RHd ,
η ≥ 0,
(12)
where η is a scaling factor, P0 represents the transmission
power budget, {θm}Mm=1 denotes an angular grid covering
the detection angular range in [−π/2, π/2], a (θm) denotes
4steering vector, Pd (θm) is the desired ideal beampattern gain
at θm, Rd represents the desired waveform covariance matrix.
Given a covariance matrix Rd that corresponds to a well-
designed MIMO radar beampattern, the fractional program-
ming optimization problem of minimizing SINRE can be
formulated as
min
Wi,RN
|α|2aH (θ0)
∑K
i=1Wia (θ0)
|α|2aH (θ0)RNa (θ0) + σ2
, (13a)
s.t. ‖RX −Rd‖2 ≤ γbp, (13b)
SINRi ≥ γb, ∀i, (13c)
tr(RX) = P0, (13d)
Wi =W
H
i ,Wi  0, ∀i, (13e)
rank (Wi) = 1, ∀i, (13f)
RN = R
H
N ,RN  0, (13g)
where the constraints Wi = W
H
i ,Wi  0, rank (Wi) =
1, ∀i, are equivalent to constraining Wi = wiwHi [20]. θ0
represents the direction of Eve known at Alice1, γbp is the
pre-defined threshold that constraints the mismatch between
designed covariance matrix RX and the desired Rd, and
finally γb denotes the predefined SINR threshold of each
legitimate user.
First, let us employ the SDR approach by relaxing the op-
timization problem by omitting the rank (Wi) = 1 constraint
in (13f), which can be written as
min
Wi,RN
|α|2aH (θ0)
∑K
i=1Wia (θ0)
|α|2aH (θ0)RNa (θ0) + σ2
, (14a)
s.t. ‖RX −Rd‖2 ≤ γbp, (14b)
SINRi ≥ γb, ∀i, (14c)
tr(RX) = P0, (14d)
Wi =W
H
i ,Wi  0, ∀i, (14e)
RN = R
H
N ,RN  0. (14f)
By noting the fact that problem (14) is still non-convex due to
the fractional objective function, we propose in the following
an iterative approach to solve the problem efficiently.
B. Efficient Solver
Following [33], (14) is single-ratio FP problem, which can
be solved by employing the Dinkelbach’s transform demon-
strated in [38], where the globally optimal solution can be
obtained by solving a sequence of SDPs. To develop the
algorithm, we firstly introduce a scaling factor c = SINRE ,
which is an auxiliary variable. We then define two scaling
variables U and V, which are nonnegative and positive re-
spectively, where U = |α|2aH (θ)∑Ki=1Wia (θ) , ∀i, V =
1The MIMO radar is assumed to be with two working modes including
searching and tracking. In the search mode, the radar transmits a spatially
orthogonal waveform, which formulates the omni-directional beampattern.
Potential targets can be searched via the beampattern. Then, the radar is able
to track potential targets via transmitting directional waveforms. Thus, the
precise location is available to be known at Alice.
|α|2aH (θ)RNa (θ) + σ2. As a result, the FP problem (14)
can be reformulated as
min
Wi,RN
U−cV, (15a)
s.t. ‖RX −Rd‖2 ≤ γbp, (15b)
SINRi ≥ γb, ∀i, (15c)
tr(RX) = P0, (15d)
Wi =W
H
i ,Wi  0, ∀i, (15e)
RN = R
H
N ,RN  0, (15f)
where c can be iteratively updated by
c [t+ 1] =
U [t]
V [t]
, (16)
where t is the index of iteration. For clarity, we summarize
the above in Algorithm 1. According to [33], it is easy
to prove the convergence of the algorithm given the non-
increasing property of c during each iteration. It is noted
that the SDR approach generates an approximated solution
to the optimization problem (13) by neglecting the rank-one
constraint. Accordingly, eigenvalue decomposition or Gaussian
randomization techniques are commonly employed to obtain
a suboptimal solution.
Algorithm 1 Alogrithm for solving FP problem (14)
Input: H, a (θ0) , σ
2, α, γbp, γb, P0, itermax ≥ 2
Output: W
(iter)
i ,R
(iter)
N , i = 1, · · · ,K
1. ComputeRd. Reformulate problem (13a) by (14). Set the
iteration threshold ε > 0. Initialize c(0), c(1),
∣∣c(1) − c(0)∣∣ >
ε.
while iter ≤ itermax and
∣∣citer+1 − citer∣∣ ≥ ε do
2. Solve the SDP problem (15).
3. Update c by (16).
4. iter = iter + 1.
end while
6. Obtain approximated solutions by eigenvalue decompo-
sition or Gaussian randomization.
C. Complexity Analysis
In this subsection, the computational complexity of Al-
gorithm 1 is analyzed as follows. Note that SDP problems
are commonly solved by the interior point method (IPM)
[39], which obtains an ǫ-optimal solution after a sequence of
iterations with the given ǫ. In problem (15), it is noted that the
constraints are linear matrix inequality (LMI) except for (15b),
which is a second-order cone (SOC) [40] constraint. Besides,
we note that the solution is required to satisfy the rank-one
constraint, the complexity of eigenvalue decomposition2 is
then taken into consideration, which is operated at the cost of
O ((K + 1)N3) complex multiplications. Thus, we demon-
strate the complexity in Table I, where Niter represents itera-
tion times. For simplicity, the computational complexity can be
given as O (√2Niter ln (1/ǫ)K3.5N6.5)+O ((K + 1)N3)by
reserving the highest order term.
2Eigenvalue decomposition is adopted to obtain a sub-optimal result be-
cause of the high complexity of Gaussian randomization.
5IV. EVE’S SINR MINIMIZATION WITH UNCERTAINTY IN
THE TARGET DIRECTION AND PERFECT CSI
In practice, the precise location of the target is difficult
to be known at transmitter. In this section, we consider the
scenario where a rough estimate of the target angle, instead
of its precise counterpart, is available at Alice. Therefore, the
following beampattern design aims at achieving both a desired
main-beam width covering the possible angle uncertainty
interval of the target as well as a minimized sidelobe power
in a prescribed region.
A. Problem Formulation
In this subsection, we consider the case that the angle
uncertainty interval of the target is roughly known within the
angular interval [θ0 −∆θ, θ0 +∆θ]. To this end, the target
from every possible direction should be taken in to considera-
tion when formulating the optimization problem. Accordingly,
the objective is given as the sum of Eve’s SINR at all the
possible locations as follows. Due to the uncertainty of target
location, wider beampattern needs to be formulated towards
the uncertain angular interval to avoid missing the target.
Inspired by the 3dB main-beam width beampattern design for
MIMO radar [41], we propose a scheme aiming at keeping a
constant power in the uncertain angular interval, which can be
formulated as the following optimization problem
min
Wi,RX
∑
θm∈Φ
|α|2aH (θm)
∑K
i=1Wia (θm)
|α|2aH (θm)RNa (θm) + σ2
(17a)
s.t. aH (θ0)RXa (θ0)− aH (θm)RXa (θm) ≥ γs,
∀θm ∈ Ω (17b)
aH (θk)RXa (θk) ≤ (1 + α)aH (θ0)RXa (θ0) ,
∀θk ∈ Φ (17c)
(1− α)aH (θ0)RXa (θ0) ≤ aH (θk)RXa (θk) ,
∀θk ∈ Φ (17d)
SINRi ≥ γb, ∀i, (17e)
tr(RX) = P0, (17f)
Wi =W
H
i , Wi  0, ∀i, (17g)
rank (Wi) = 1, ∀i, (17h)
RN = R
H
N , RN  0, (17i)
where θ0 is the main-beam location, Ω denotes the sidelobe
region of interest, Φ denotes the wide main-beam region, γs
is the bound of the sidelobe power.
Likewise, recall the problem (13), SDR technique is adopted
by neglecting rank-1 constraint in (17h). To solve the above
sum-of-ratio problem, according to [33], we equivalently re-
cast transform the minimization problem as
max
Wi,RX
∑
θm∈Φ
|α|2aH (θm)RNa (θm) + σ2
|α|2aH (θm)
∑K
i=1Wia (θm)
(18a)
s.t. aH (θ0)RXa (θ0)− aH (θm)RXa (θm) ≥ γs,
∀θm ∈ Ω (18b)
aH (θk)RXa (θk) ≤ (1 + α)aH (θ0)RXa (θ0) ,
∀θk ∈ Φ (18c)
(1− α)aH (θ0)RXa (θ0) ≤ aH (θk)RXa (θk) ,
∀θk ∈ Φ (18d)
SINRi ≥ γb, ∀i, (18e)
tr(RX) = P0, (18f)
Wi =W
H
i , Wi  0, ∀i, (18g)
RN = R
H
N , RN  0. (18h)
It is noted that problem (18) is still non-convex. The approach
to solve this sum-of-ratio FP problem is described in the
following.
B. Efficient Solver
To present the solution to problem (18), we firstly refer to
[33] and denote
A (θm) = |α|2aH (θm)RNa (θm) + σ2
B (θm) = |α|2aH (θm)
∑K
i=1
Wia (θm)
One step further, the sum-of-ratio problem is equivalent to the
following optimization problem, which can be rewritten in the
form
max
Wi,RN ,y
∑
θm∈Φ
(
2ym
√
A (θm)− y2mB (θm)
)
, (19a)
s.t. aH (θ0)RXa (θ0)− aH (θm)RXa (θm) ≥ γs,
∀θm ∈ Ω (19b)
aH (θk)RXa (θk) ≤ (1 + α)aH (θ0)RXa (θ0) ,
∀θk ∈ Φ (19c)
(1− α)aH (θ0)RXa (θ0) ≤ aH (θk)RXa (θk) ,
∀θk ∈ Φ (19d)
SINRi ≥ γb, ∀i, (19e)
tr(RX) = P0, (19f)
Wi =W
H
i , Wi  0, ∀i, (19g)
RN = R
H
N , RN  0, (19h)
where y denotes a collection of variables {y1, · · · , yM}. The
optimal ym can be obtained in the following closed form when
θm is fixed
y∗m =
√
A (θm)
B (θm)
. (20)
To this end, the problem (19) can be solved by the SDR
technique. Then, eigenvalue decomposition or Gaussian ran-
domization is required to get the approximated solution. For
clarity, the above procedure is summarized in Algorithm 2.
6Algorithm 2 Algorithm for solving sum-of-ratio problem (19)
Input: H, a (θ) or a (θm), σ
2, α, γb, P0, itermax ≥ 2, ∆θ.
Output: W
(iter)
i ,R
(iter)
N , i = 1, · · · ,K .
1. Compute Rd. Reformulate problem (17) by (19). Set the
iteration threshold ε > 0.
while iter ≤ itermax and
∥∥yiter+1 − yiter∥∥ ≥ ε do
2. Solve the new convex optimization problem.
3. Update y by (20).
4. Get updated Wi, ∀i, and RN by solving (19) using
SDR.
5. iter = iter + 1.
end while
6. Obtain approximate solutions by eigenvalue decomposi-
tion or Gaussian randomization.
C. Complexity Analysis
We end this section by computing the complexity of solving
problem (19). It is noted that all the constraints can be
considered as LMIs in optimization problem (19). We denote
Φ0 = card(Φ) and Ω0 = card(Ω) as the cardinality of Φ and
Ω, respectively. Likely, eigenvalue decomposition operation is
required as well, with the cost of O
(
(K + 1)N3
)
. Thus, refer-
ring to [39], we give the computational complexity in Table I,
which can be simplified as O (3√2Niter ln (1/ǫ)K3.5N6.5)+
O ((K + 1)N3) by reserving the highest order.
V. ROBUST BEAMFORMING WITH IMPERFECT CSI AND
TARGET DIRECTION UNCERTAINTY
In this section, based on the models presented in the
previous sections, we consider the case that perfect channel
information is not available at the base station. By relying
on the method of robust optimization, we generalize an opti-
mization problem to obtain beamforming design that is robust
to the channel uncertainty, which is bounded in a spherical
region. Meanwhile, to guarantee the generality, we minimize
the worst-case SINR received at the target in the angular
interval of possible location of potential eavesdropper.
A. Problem Formulation
According to [42], an additive channel error model of i-th
downlink user can be formulated as hi = h˜i + ei, where
h˜i is the estimated channel information known at Alice,
and ei denotes the channel uncertainty within the spherical
region ℑi = {ei|‖ei‖2 ≤ µ2i }. Following the well-known S-
procedure , ∀eHi ei ≤ µ2i , the constraint that guarantees the
worst-case SINR of legitimates users can be reformulated as
(
h˜i + ei
)H Wi − γb
K∑
k=1,k 6=i
Wk − γbRN

(h˜i + ei
)
− γbσ2 ≥ 0, ∀i.
(21)
Then, we minimize the possible maximum Eve SINR in
the main-beam region of interest, which yields the following
robust optimization problem
min
Wi,RN ,ti
max
θm∈Φ
|α|2aH (θm)
∑K
i=1Wia (θm)
|α|2aH (θm)RNa (θm) + σ2
(22a)
s.t.
(
h˜Ti Yih˜
∗
i − γbσ2 − tiµ2i h˜Ti Yi
Yih˜
∗
i Yi + tiIN
)
 0, ∀i,
(22b)
Yi :=Wi − γb

∑
k 6=i
Wk

− γbRN
aH (θ0)RXa (θ0)− aH (θm)RXa (θm) > γs,
∀θm ∈ Ω (22c)
aH (θk)RXa (θk) 6 (1 + α) a
H (θ0)RXa (θ0) ,
∀θk ∈ Φ (22d)
(1− α)aH (θ0)RXa (θ0) 6 aH (θk)RXa (θk) ,
∀θk ∈ Φ (22e)
tr(RX) = P0, (22f)
ti > 0, ∀i, (22g)
Wi =W
H
i ,Wi  0, ∀i, (22h)
rank (Wi) = 1, ∀i, (22i)
RN = R
H
N ,RN  0, (22j)
where Φ = [θ0 −∆θ, θ0 +∆θ] is the main-beam region of
interest,m = 1, · · · ,M .M represents the number of detecting
angles in the interval Φ, and finally t = [t1, · · · , tK ] is an
auxiliary vector relying on the S-procedure.
B. Efficient Solver
To solve problem (22), the SDR approach is adopted again
by dropping the rank-1 constraint in (22i). Moreover, the
objective function (22a) can be transformed to a max-min
problem initially which is given as
max
Wi,RN ,ti
min
θm∈Φ
|α|2aH (θm)RNa (θm) + σ2
|α|2aH (θm)
∑K
i=1Wia (θm)
. (23)
To verify this, we introduce a variable z and define
A (θm) = a (θm)a
H (θm). The objective function (23)
can be rewritten as max
Wi,RN ,ti,z
z , which subjects to
z ≤
(
tr (A (θm)RN ) + σ
2
/
|α|2
)/
tr
(
A (θm)
∑K
i=1Wi
)
and any other contraints in (19). Likewise, we denote
C (θm) = tr (A (θm)RN) + σ
2
/
|α|2
D (θm) = tr
(
A (θm)
∑K
i=1
Wi
)
The aforementioned constraint is equivalent to
z ≤ max
ym
(
2ym
√
C (θm)− y2mD (θm)
)
,
7which is a less-than-max inequality, so max
ym
can be integrated
into the objective. Consequently, problem (22) is reformulated
as
max
Wi,RN ,y,ti,z
z, (24a)
s.t. 2ym
√
C (θm)− y2mD (θm) ≥ z, θm ∈ Φ, ∀m, (24b)(
h˜Ti Yih˜
∗
i − γbσ2 − tiµ2i h˜Ti Yi
Yih˜
∗
i Yi + tiIN
)
 0, ∀i,
(24c)
Yi :=Wi − γb

∑
k 6=i
Wk

− γbRN
aH (θ0)RXa (θ0)− aH (θm)RXa (θm) ≥ γs,
∀θm ∈ Ω (24d)
aH (θk)RXa (θk) ≤ (1 + α)aH (θ0)RXa (θ0) ,
∀θk ∈ Φ (24e)
(1− α)aH (θ0)RXa (θ0) ≤ aH (θk)RXa (θk) ,
∀θk ∈ Φ (24f)
tr(RX) = P0, (24g)
ti ≥ 0, ∀i, (24h)
Wi =W
H
i ,Wi  0, ∀i, (24i)
RN = R
H
N ,RN  0, (24j)
where ym is an auxiliary variable, each ym corresponds to the
radar detecting angles θm in the main-beam region of interest
Φ. We refer the rest variables to the definitions which we
presented in the previous sections. Note that problem (24) is
convex and can be readily tackled. Here, we define a collection
of variables y = {y1, · · · , yM}. To solve this problem,
we apply the quadratic transform and optimize the primal
variablesWi,RN , ti and the auxiliary variable collection y in
an alternating manner. When the primal variables are obtained
by initializing the collection y, the optimal ym can be updated
by
y∗m =
√
C (θm)
D (θm)
. (25)
To this end, eigenvalue decomposition or Gaussian randomiza-
tion is required to obtain approximated solutions. For clarity,
solution to problem (24) can be summarized as Algorithm 3.
C. Complexity Analysis
The complexity of Algorithm 3 is analyzed in this subsec-
tion. Similarly, Φ and Ω can be regarded as discrete domains.
We denote Φ0 = card(Φ) and Ω0 = card(Ω) as the cardinal-
ity of Φ and Ω, respectively. All the constraints in problem
(24) are LMIs. Specifically, we notice that the problem is
composed by 3Φ0 + Ω0 +K + 1 LMI constraints of size 1,
2K+2 LMI constraints of size N , and K LMI constraints of
size N + 1. Considering eigenvalue decomposition operation
is required at the cost of O
(
(K + 1)N3
)
, it follows that the
complexity is given in Table I. For simplicity, we reserve the
highest order of computational complexity, which can be given
as O (4√3Niter ln (1/ǫ)K3.5N6.5)+O ((K + 1)N3).
Algorithm 3 Method for Solving multiple-ratio FP problem
(24)
Input: A(θm) , h˜i, σ
2, α, γb, γs, P0, CSI estimation error
threshold µi > 0, definite the main-beam width Φ, iteration
threshold ε > 0, itermax > 2.
Initialization: Set initial values for y(0),y(1), which∥∥y(1) − y(0)∥∥ > ε.
while iter 6 itermax and
∥∥y(iter+1) − y(iter)∥∥ > ε do
1. Reformulate problem (19) by replacing the fractional
objective function with the form in (22b).
2. Reconstruct the problem with variable z.
3. Solve the optimization problem, and then update y by
(23).
4. Update the primal variables by (22), over RN ,Wi, ∀i
for fixed y.
end while
Output: RN ,Wi, ti, z, ∀i.
6. Obtain approximate solutions by eigenvalue decomposi-
tion or Gaussian randomization.
VI. ROBUST OPTIMAL BEAMFORMING WITH
STATISTICAL CSI AND TARGET DIRECTION UNCERTAINTY
In this section, we consider the extension of the scenario
in section V, where channel from Alice to Bobs is rapidly
time-varying. As a result, the instantaneous CSI is difficult
to be estimated [43]. Note that the second-order channel
statistics, which vary much more slowly, can be obtained
by the BS through long-term feedback. Nevertheless, even
when the statistical CSI is known at Alice, it always includes
uncertainty. Herewith, we take the uncertainty matrix into
consideration by employing additive errors to the channel
covariance.
A. Problem Formulation
As the statistical CSI is known to BS instead of instanta-
neous CSI , we rewrite the SINR of the i-th user as
SINRi =
tr
(
R˜hiWi
)
∑K
k 6=i,k=1 tr
(
R˜hiWk
)
+ tr
(
R˜hiRN
)
+ σ2
,
(26)
where R˜hi = E
{
h∗ih
T
i
}
denotes the i-th user’s downlink
channel covariance matrix with uncertainty. Therefore, the true
channel covariance matrix can be modeled as Rhi = R˜hi +
∆i, ∀i, where ∆i, ∀i are the estimated error matrices. The
Frobenius norm of the error matrix of i-th user is assumed
to be upper-bounded by a known constant δi, which can be
expressed as ‖∆i‖ ≤ δi. To this end, based on Lagrange dual
function [34], [44], the constraint corresponding to QoS of i-th
user can be formulated as
− δi ‖Ai + Zi‖ − tr (Rhi (Zi +Ai))− γbtr (RhiRN)
− γbσ2 ≥ 0
Zi = Z
H
i ,Zi  0, ∀i
8where Ai = γb
∑K
k=1,k 6=iWk −Wi, ∀i. Recalling the opti-
mization problem in Section V-A, likewise, the robust beam-
forming problem with erroneous statistical CSI is given as
min
Wi,RN ,Zi
max
θm∈Φ
|α|2aH (θm)
∑K
i=1Wia (θm)
|α|2aH (θm)RNa (θm) + σ2
(27a)
s.t. − δi ‖Ai + Zi‖ − tr (Rhi (Zi +Ai))− γbtr (RhiRN )
− γbσ2 ≥ 0, ∀i,
(27b)
aH (θ0)RXa (θ0)− aH (θm)RXa (θm) ≥ γs,
∀θm ∈ Ω (27c)
aH (θk)RXa (θk) ≤ (1 + α)aH (θ0)RXa (θ0) ,
∀θk ∈ Φ (27d)
(1− α)aH (θ0)RXa (θ0) ≤ aH (θk)RXa (θk) ,
∀θk ∈ Φ (27e)
tr(RX) = P0, (27f)
Zi = Z
H
i ,Zi  0, ∀i, (27g)
Wi =W
H
i ,Wi  0, ∀i, (27h)
rank (Wi) = 1, ∀i, (27i)
RN = R
H
N ,RN  0, (27j)
We note that the problem (27) can be solved with SDR
approach by dropping the rank-one constraint in (27i). One
step further, similar to (22), problem (27) can be reformulated
in a similar way, given by
max
Wi,RN ,Zi,z
z (28a)
s.t. 2ym
√
C (θm)− y2mD (θm) ≥ z, θm ∈ Φ, ∀m, (28b)
− δi ‖Ai + Zi‖ − tr (Rhi (Zi +Ai))− γbtr (RhiRN)
− γbσ2 ≥ 0, ∀i,
(28c)
aH (θ0)RXa (θ0)− aH (θm)RXa (θm) ≥ γs,
∀θm ∈ Ω (28d)
aH (θk)RXa (θk) ≤ (1 + α)aH (θ0)RXa (θ0) ,
∀θk ∈ Φ (28e)
(1− α)aH (θ0)RXa (θ0) ≤ aH (θk)RXa (θk) ,
∀θk ∈ Φ (28f)
tr(RX) = P0, (28g)
Zi = Z
H
i ,Zi  0, (28h)
Wi =W
H
i ,Wi  0, (28i)
RN = R
H
N ,RN  0. (28j)
Note that problem (28) is a convex SDP problem and can
be solved in polynomial time using interior-point algorithms
[34]. To this end, approximated solution can be obtained by
eigenvalue decomposition or Gaussian randomization.
B. Complexity Analysis
The complexity of problem (27) is given as follows. As
is noted in problem (28), almost all the constrains are LMI
except for the SOC constraint (28c). Likewise, we denote
Φ0 = card(Φ) and Ω0 = card(Ω) as the cardinality of Φ and
Ω. Note that the problem is composed by K SOC constraints
of size 1, Ω0+3Φ0+1 LMI constraints of size 1, and 4K+2
LMIs of size N . Accordingly, we compute the complexity
as is shown in Table I, which can be simply demonstrated
as O (5√2Niter ln (1/ǫ)K3.5N6.5)+O ((K + 1)N3). which
is the complexity of each iteration. Then, The calculated
complexities of all the proposed optimizations are summarised
in Table 1.
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VII. NUMERICAL RESULTS
To evaluate the proposed methods, numerical results based
on Monte Carlo simulations are shown in this section to val-
idate the effectiveness of the proposed beamforming method.
Without loss of generality, each entry of channel matrix H is
assumed to obey standard Complex Gaussian distribution, i.e.
hi,j ∼ CN (0, 1). We assume that the DFRC base station em-
ploys a ULA with half-wavelength spacing between adjacent
antennas. In the following simulations, the number of antennas
is set as N = 18 and the number of legitimate users is K = 4.
The constrained beamforming design problems in Section II-
Section V are solved by the classic SDR technique using the
CVX toolbox [45].
A. Beam Gain And Secrecy Rate Analysis
We first show the resultant radar beampattern in Fig. 2
with different angular interval of target location uncertainty,
i.e. [−5◦, 5◦] and [−10◦, 10◦]. The SINR threshold of each
legitimate user is set as γb = 10dB. The narrow beampattern
when the target location is precisely known at the BS is set as a
benchmark. It is found that the desired beampattern with wide
main-beam is obtained by solving the proposed algorithms,
which maintain the same power in the region of possible target
location. Additionally, it is noted that with the expansion of
location uncertainty angular interval, the power gain of main-
beam reduces.
9TABLE I
COMPLEXITY ANALYSIS
Complexity
Perfect CSI and
Precise Target Location
O
(
Niter ln (1/ǫ)
√
2N (K + 1) +K + 3 ·KN2
(
(K + 1)
(
KN2 + 1
)
+ 2N3
(
K2N +KN +K + 1
)))
+O
(
Niter ln (1/ǫ)
√
2N (K + 1) +K + 3 ·KN4
(
K2N2 + 1
))
+O
(
(K + 1)N3
)
Perfect CSI and
Target Location Uncertainty
O
(
Niter ln (1/ǫ)
√
2N (K + 1) +K + Ω0 + 2Φ0 + 1 ·KN2
(
KN2 + 1
)
(K + Ω0 + 2Φ0 + 1)
)
+O
(
Niter ln (1/ǫ)
√
2N (K + 1) +K +Ω0 + 2Φ0 + 1 ·KN2
(
2N3
(
K2N +KN +K + 1
)
+K2N4
))
+O
(
(K + 1)N3
)
Imperfect CSI and
Target Location Uncertainty
O
(
Niter ln (1/ǫ)
√
3NK + 2 (K +N + Ω0 + Φ0) + 1 ·KN2
(
KN2 + 1
)
(K + Ω0 + 3Φ0 + 1)
)
+O
(
Niter ln (1/ǫ)
√
3NK + 2 (K +N +Ω0 + Φ0) + 1 · 2KN5 (K + 1) (KN + 1)
)
+O
(
Niter ln (1/ǫ)
√
3NK + 2 (K +N + Ω0 +Φ0) + 1 ·KN2
(
K(N + 1)2
(
KN2 +N + 1
)
+K2N4
))
+O
(
(K + 1)N3
)
Statistical CSI and
Target Location Uncertainty
O
(
Niter ln (1/ǫ)
√
2N (2K + 1) + 3Φ0 +Ω0 + 1 ·KN2
((
KN2 + 1
)
(3Φ0 + Ω0 + 1) +K
))
+O
(
Niter ln (1/ǫ)
√
2N (2K + 1) + 3Φ0 + Ω0 + 1 ·KN2
(
2N3 (2K + 1) (KN + 1) +K2N4
))
+O
(
(K + 1)N3
)
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Fig. 2. Beampatterns with various target direction uncertainty interval when (a) CSI is known, (b) CSI is imperfectly known and (c) statistical CSI is
imperfectly known.
The achievable secrecy rate in terms of increasing SINR
threshold of each user is demonstrated in Fig. 3, where the
power budget is set as P0 = 20dBm and P0 = 30dBm
respectively. In this case, we set the sidelobe power threshold
γs = 40dB. Basically, in the SINRE minimization problem,
the secrecy rate increases with the growth of γb. It is notewor-
thy that the system achieves higher secrecy rate when both the
target location and CSI are precisely known. Besides, when
we increase the power budget, the secrecy rate grows to some
extent.
In Fig. 4, we evaluate the convergence of target SINR and
secrecy rate. In these cases, the same system parameters are set
as previous simulations. In Fig. 4(a), the SINR of the target is
confirmed to convergent to a minimum. In robust beamforming
design problems, the SINR of target decreases slightly with the
increasing iteration number, which results in the slight growth
of secrecy rate as is shown in Fig. 4(b).
B. Trade-off Between The Performance Of Radar And Com-
munication System
In this subsection, we evaluate the performance trade-off
between radar and communication system. Fig. 5 shows the
secrecy rate performance with various angular intervals for
γb = 10dB and γb = 15dB. The main-beam power decreases
when the target uncertainty increases, then the leaking infor-
mation would get less, which improve the secrecy rate. As
is demonstrated in Fig. 5, the secrecy rate increases with the
growth of target uncertainty interval. Besides, with 5dB growth
of legitimate user SINR threshold, the secrecy rate increases
0.5bit/s/Hz approximately.
Fig. 6 demonstrates the secrecy rate performance versus the
threshold of sidelobe with P0 = 30dBm,∆θ = 5
◦, which
reveals the trade-off between the performance of radar and
communication systems. In Algorithm 2, the power difference
between main beam and sidelobe increases with the growth of
γs, which results in the increasing possibility of information
leaking. As the numerical result shown in Fig. 6, it is notable
that the secrecy rate decreases with the growth of γs, especially
the tendency gets obvious when γs is greater than 30dB.
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C. Robust Beamforming Performance
As the norm of CSI error is bounded by a constant, the
secrecy rate performance versus error bound is illustrated in
Fig. 7, with different location uncertainty. With the growth
of error bound, the achievable SINR at each legitimate user
keeps being above the given threshold but not a constant
according to constraints (24c) and (27b). We note that the
achievable secrecy rate reduces after a certain value with the
increasing error bound, because of the different changing rate
between target SINR and user SINR corresponding to various
error bounds in Fig. 7. Whereas, as is shown in Fig. 8, the
secrecy rate keeps increasing with the growth of error bound.
In addition, the robust beamforming designs achieve higher
secrecy rate when the location uncertainty is limited in a larger
interval.
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VIII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, optimization based beamforming designs have
been addressed for MIMO DFRC system, which aimed at
ensuring the security of information transmission in case of
leaking to targets by adding AN at the transmitter to confuse
the potential eavesdropper. Specifically, we have minimized
the SINR of the target which is regarded as the potential
eavesdropper while keeping the each legitimate user’s SINR
above a certain constant to ensure the secrecy rate of the DFRC
system. Throughout this paper, the optimization beamforming
problem has been designed with perfect CSI and imperfect
CSI, as well as with the accurate and inaccurate target location
information.
First of all, both precise location of target and perfect CSI
have been assumed to be known at BS, which gained the
highest secrecy rate according to the numerical results. When
the target location was uncertain, the main-beam power has
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CSI is imperfectly known, N = 18, K = 4, P0 = 30dBm, γb = 10dB.
decreased with the growth of the uncertainty angular interval.
Moreover, the secrecy rate versus different thresholds of
sidelobe has been demonstrated, which revealed the trade-off
between radar and communication system performance. Then,
we have formulated target SINR minimization problem with
imperfect instantaneous CSI and statistical CSI known to the
base station respectively. As shown in the numerical results,
the beamforming design has been feasible in both robust
scenarios. Finally, simulation results have been presented to
show the secrecy rate tendency effected by error bound with
various target location uncertainty.
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